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FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-THE
SUPREME COURT LIMITS THE RIGHT
TO PRIVACY
Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
I. INTRODUCTION
Ever since the landmark decision of Griswold v. Connecticut, I the
Supreme Court has consistently enlarged the privacy rights of indi-
viduals based on the penumbral protections of the first, third,
fourth, fifth, ninth and 'fourteenth amendments to the Unted States
Constitution.2 Although no individual right to privacy is expressly
found in the Constitution, 3 the Court has repeatedly recognized an
individual's right to make choices regarding intimate aspects of
one's own life in the area of sexual expression. 4
Society's moral views concerning sexual permissiveness have
arguably become more liberal.5 Sexual permissiveness is commonly
regarded as an essential freedom. 6 The Supreme Court's trend of
expanding the penumbra of individual privacy rights has been con-
sistent with the liberalization of society's morals concerning sexual
freedom. In Bowers v. Hardwick,7 however, the Supreme Court se-
verely restricted the individual's right to privacy in holding that the
Georgia sodomy statute8  was constitutional as applied to
1 381 U.S. 479 (1965)(the right to privacy encompassed an individual's right to use
contraceptives). See infra notes 156-63 and accompanying text.
2 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-86. The right to privacy identified in Griswold was later
expanded in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976); and Gary v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). See infra
notes 156-75 and accompanying text.
3 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
4 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
5 See, e.g., Ingber, A Dialectic: The Fulfillment and Decrease of Passion in Criminal Law, 28
RUTGERS L. REV. 861, 873 (1975); Annotation, Consent as Defense in Prosecution for Sodomy,
58 A.L.R. 3D 636, 640 (1974).
6 See generally Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980); W.
BARNETT, SEXUAL FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION (1973); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW (1978).
7 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
8 The Georgia statute provides, in pertinent part: "A person commits the offense of
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homosexuals. 9
By narrowly interpreting the right to privacy, the Bowers Court
reversed the prior trend of expanding individual privacy rights. The
Court also undermined the legitimacy of its prior decisions which
recognized the value of an individual's independence to make cer-
tain important decisions regarding sexual expression and the right
to carry out those decisions. 10
This Note examines the right to privacy by analyzing the
Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick. In elucidating the
errors in the majority's reasoning, this Note argues that the right to
privacy should yield an individual right of autonomy concerning
consensual sexual activities. Furthermore, the majority's focus on
an incorrectly stated, narrowly drawn issue confused the rights of
homosexuals concerning sexual fulfillment. Finally, this Note will
suggest the implications that Bowers could pose in the future.
II. FACTS OF BOWERS
Michael Hardwick was arrested on August 3, 1982 and charged
with violating the Georgia sodomy statute' by committing sodomy
sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one
person and the mouth or anus of another... (b) A person convicted of the offense of
sodomy shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20
years .... GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984).
9 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2843.
10 See infra notes 140-75 and accompanying text.
S1I See supra note 8. The following state statutes prohibit various forms of private
consensual sodomy: ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-64 to -65 (1982); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13-1411 to -1412 (1978 & Supp. 1983-1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1813 (1977);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3502 (Michie 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800-2 (West 1976); IDAHO
CODE § 18-6605 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (West. Supp. 1984); Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 510.100 (Michie/Bobbs-Merril 1975); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:78 (West 1974 &
Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE §§ 27-553 to -554 (Michie 1982); MASS. ANN. LAws, ch.
272, §§ 34-35 (West 1970); MIcH. COMP. LAws §§ 750.158, .338, .388a, .388b (1968);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.293 -.294 (West Supp. 1984); Miss. CODE ANN. § 566.090
(Vernon 1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-505 (1984); NEv. REV. STAT. § 201.190 (1979);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-177 (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 886 (West 1983); R.I. GEN.
LAws § 11-10-1 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law Co-op. 1977); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-2-612 (1982); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-403, -406 (1978 & Supp. 1983); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 944.17 (West 1982 & Supp. 1983-
1984). The following state statutes have been declared unconstitutional by the state
courts: GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1982)(declared unconstitutional by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11th
Cir. 1985)); N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 130.00, .38 (McKinney 1975)(criminal statute invali-
dated by the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415
N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. §§ 1301, 1324 (1973)(criminal statutes invalidated by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa.'91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980)); TEx. PENAL CODE
ANN. tit. 5, § 21.06 (Vernon 1974)(held unconstitutional by the United States District
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in his home with another consenting male adult.12 After a hearing,
the District Attorney decided not to pursue the case to the grand
jury because of a lack of evidence.13 Hardwick subsequently filed
suit asking the court to declare the Georgia sodomy statute uncon-
stitutional.1 4 Hardwick alleged that he was a practicing homosexual
who regularly engaged in sexual acts, and would continue to do so
in the future. 15 The district court granted the state's motion to dis-
miss for failure to state a claim. 16 The court ruled that, although
Hardwick did in fact have standing to sue, the Supreme Court's
summary affirmance in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney 17 foreclosed
any constitutional challenge to the statute.' 8
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit held that Hardwick had standing to bring suit.' 9 The appel-
late court reversed and remanded regarding the constitutional chal-
Court for the Northern District of Texas in Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex.
1982)). The following state session laws have decriminalized private, consensual sod-
omy between adult homosexuals: 1978 Alaska Sess. Laws, ch. 166 (effective Jan. 1,
1980); 1975 Cal. Stat., ch. 71, § 7 (effective July 1, 1976); 1971 Colo. Sess. Laws, ch.
121, § 1 (approved June 2, 1971); 1969 Conn. Pub. Acts 828, § 214 (effective Oct. 1,
1971); 58 Del. Laws, ch. 497, § I (effective April 1, 1973); 1972 Haw. Sess. Laws, act 9,
§ 1 (effectiveJan. 1, 1983); 1961 Ill. Laws, pt. 1983, § 11-2 (effectiveJan. 1, 1962); 1976
Ind. Acts. P.L. 148, § 24 (effectiveJuly 1, 1977); Iowa Acts ch. 1245, § 520 (effectiveJan.
1, 1978); 1975 Me. Acts, ch. 499, § 5 (effective Mar. 1, 1976); 1977 Neb. Laws, L.B. 38,
§ 328 (effectiveJuly 1, 1978); 1973 N.H. Laws, 532:26 (effective Nov. 1, 1973); 1978 N.J.
Laws, ch. 95, § 2C:98-2 (effective Sept. 1, 1979); 1975 N.M. Laws, ch. 109, § 8; 1977
N.D. Laws, ch. 122, § I (approved Mar. 19, 1977); 1972 Ohio Laws, 134, § 2 (effective
Jan. 1, 1974); 1971 Or. Laws, ch. 743, § 432 (167.040)(effective Jan. 1, 1972); 1976 S.D.
Laws, ch. 158, § 22-8 (effective Apr.1, 1977); 1977 Vt. Laws, No. 51, § 3 (effectiveJuly 1,
1977); 1975 Wash. Laws, 1st exec. Sess., ch. 260 (effectiveJuly 1, 1976); 1976 W. Va.
Acts, ch. 43 (effectiveJune 11, 1976); 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 70, § 3 (effective May
27, 1977).
12 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2842; Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1203 (11th Cir.
1985), reh'g denied, 762 F.2d 1123 (11th Cir. 1985).
13 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2842.
14 Id. Hardwick challenged the constitutionality of criminalizing consensual sodomy.
The complaint named as defendants Michael Bowers, Attorney General of Georgia;
Lewis Slator, District Attorney for Fulton County; and George Napper, Public Safety
Commissioner of Atlanta. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1204.
15 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2842. John and Mary Doe, a married couple, joined in the suit
claiming they desired to engage in sexual activity proscribed by the statute, but felt
"chilled and deterred" due to the existence of the statute, coupled with Hardwick's re-
cent arrest. Id. at 2842 n.2.
16 Id. at 2842.
17 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), summarily aff'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976)(Virginia
sodomy statute held constitutional).
18 Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1204-10.
19 Id. at 1204-07. The district court prevously had held that because the Does had
neither sustained, nor were in immediate danger of sustaining, any direct injury from
the enforcement of the statute, they did not have standing.
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lenge to the Georgia sodomy statute.20 The appellate court held
that the summary affirmance in Commonwealth's Attorney was not dis-
positive regarding the constitutionality of the statute because doctri-
nal developments subsequent to Commonwealth's Attorney undermined
its precedential value.2 1
The court of appeals found that the Georgia statute criminaliz-
ing sodomy contravened a fundamental right to engage in private,
consensual sexual activity. 22 The appellate court held that an indi-
vidual's right to sexual fulfillment via private, consensual acts was
constitutionally protected by the right to privacy. The court stated
that "[t]he Constitution prevents the States from unduly interfering
in certain individual decisions critical to personal autonomy because
those decisions are essentially private and beyond the legitimate
reach of a civilized society." 23
The court of appeals then determined that upon remand the
state must prove both a compelling interest to regulate such behav-
ior, and that the statute was narrowly drawn to serve that interest.24
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the
Georgia sodomy statute violated the fundamental rights of
homosexuals. 25
III. THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY
A sharply divided Court26 reversed the court of appeals and
held that the Georgia statute was constitutional and did not violate
the fundamental rights of homosexuals. 27 Justice White stated the
20 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2843.
21 Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1208-10. The court of appeals pointed to two decisions:
Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 688 n.5 (1977)("T]he court
has not definitively answered the difficult question whether and to what extent the Con-
stitution prohibits state statutes regulating [private consensual sexual] behavior among
adults" (brackets in original)); and New York v. Uplinger, 467 U.S. 246 (1983)("[T]he
Supreme Court was prepared to address the constitutionality of state regulations like
Georgia's sodomy statute but chose to address the issue when presented more directly
in another case.").
22 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2843.
23 Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1212-13.
24 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2843. The Supreme Court first enunciated this test in Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
25 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2843.
26 Justice White wrote the opinion for the majority, and Justices Burger and Powell
filed concurring opinions. Justice Blackmun filed a vigorous dissent, and was joined by
Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens. Justice Stevens filed a separate dissent, in
which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined.
27 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2841.
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question presented as follows: "[W]hether the Federal Constitution
confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sod-
omy and hence invalidates the laws of the many states that still make
such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time." 28
Justice White objected to the court of appeals' view that the line
of cases beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut 29 conferred a right of
privacy aimed at individual autonomy.30 Justice White found the
right of privacy to be applicable only to factual situations regarding
family, marriage and procreation.31 In voicing his disregard of the
individual autonomy view of the right to privacy, Justice White
stated that "any claim that these cases nevertheless stand for the
proposition that any kind of private conduct between consenting
adults is constitutionally insulated from state proscription is unsup-
portable."3 2 Next, Justice White rejected Hardwick's argument that
there is a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy.33
Justice White noted that the fifth and fourteenth amendments had
previously been interpreted to recognize substantive rights.3 4 He
denounced, however, such "substantive due process ' 35 and reas-
serted that certain fundamental liberties are "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty"3 6 and "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition."37  Because laws proscribing sodomy have "ancient
28 Id. at 2843.
29 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
30 Justice White referred to the Court's prior cases construing the right to privacy
and their factual settings: Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) and Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)(child rearing and education); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158 (1944) (family relationships); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex. rel. Williamson, 316
U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)(con-
traception); and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)(abortion).
31 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. The right to privacy has usually been anchored in the fourteenth amendment,
which reads:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within itsjurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
35 See infra notes 283-95 and accompanying text.
36 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (193 7 )(a state statute allowing appeal
by the state in criminal cases for correction of errors of law was held consistent with due
process under the fourteenth amendment).
37 Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)(opinion of Powell, J.). In Moore, an
East Cleveland housing ordinance defining "family" was unconstitutional because it vio-
lated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. AlthoughJustice White tried
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roots,"3 8 justice White reasoned "[i]t is obvious to us that neither of
these formulations would extend a fundamental right to homosexu-
als to engage in acts of consensual sodomy." 39 After engaging in an
historical discussion of the criminal offenses of sodomy,40 the Court
declined to enlarge the right to privacy and asserted that engaging
in sodomitic activities was not a fundamental right.41
Next, the majority rejected the respondent's argument based
on Stanley v. Georgia42 that the Constitution protects homosexual
conduct in the privacy of one's home.43 While recognizing that
Stanley gave special protection to certain conduct that would not be
protected outside the home, the majority in Bowers found Stanley in-
applicable because "the decision was firmly grounded in the First
Amendment." 44 Justice White stated that all illegal conduct was not
immunized when occurring within the home, specifying victimless
crimes as an example.45 The Court analogized homosexual conduct
to other victimless crimes46 in asserting that allowance of Hard-
wick's claim would mean "startling] down the road" to recognizing
as a fundamental right these other crimes.47
The Court then asserted that a presumption of public morality
against homosexuality was sufficient to support a criminal statute.48
to limit fundamental rights to specific cases, additional language in Moore points to a
different theory: "Appropriate limits on substantive due process come not from drawing
arbitrary lines but rather from careful respect for the teachings of history [and] solid
recognition of the basic values that underlie our society." Id. at 503 (quoting Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965)(Harland, J., concurring)).
38 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2844. Justice White cited Comment, Survey on the'Constitutional
Right to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual Activity, 40 U. MIAMi L. REV. 521, 525 (1986).
39 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
40 Justice White further noted:
Sodomy was a criminal offense at common law and was forbidden by the laws of the
original thirteen states when they ratified the Bill of Rights. In 1868, when the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, all but 5 of the 37 states in the Union had
criminal sodomy laws. In fact, until 1961, all 50 states outlawed sodomy, and today,
24 states and the District of Columbia continue to provide criminal penalties for
sodomy performed in private and between consenting adults.
Id. at 2845.
41 Id. at 2846. The Court reasoned that an expansive view of the determinaton of
fundamental rights "comes nearest to illegitimacy" because it becomes "judge-made
constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the
Constitution." Id.
42 394 U.S. 557 (1969)(obscene films, although punishable in public, are allowable in
the privacy of the home).
43 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2846.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 In addition to illegal drugs, Justice White used as examples of victimless crimes,




The Court noted that the law continually reflects notions of moral-
ity.4 9 The state's notion concerning the morality of homosexual
conduct, the Court asserted, should not be declared inadequate to
justify the Georgia sodomy statute.50 Finally, the Court declined to
respond to Hardwick's constitutional arguments concerning Geor-
gia's sodomy statute based on the ninth amendment, the equal pro-
tection clause or the eighth amendment because Hardwick did not
raise these issues below. 51
B. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER'S CONCURRENCE
Similar to the majority's opinion, Chief Justice Burger empha-
sized that "there is no such thing as a fundamental right to commit
homosexual sodomy." 52 Chief Justice Burger traced the proscrip-
tions against sodomy throughout the history of Western Civiliza-
tion.53 He concluded from this evidence that homosexual sodomy is
not a fundamental right.54
C. JUSTICE POWELL'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Powell also wrote a separate concurrence. Whilejoining
in the opinion of the Court, Justice Powell doubted the constitution-




51 Id. at n.8. See infra notes 53, 197-201 and accompanying text.
52 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2847 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
53 Id. (Burger, CJ., concurring). For some proscriptions against sodomy see CODE
TH. 9.7.6 (Roman law); An Act for the Punishment of the Vice of Buggery, 1533-34, 25
Hen. VIII, c. 6 (the first English criminal sodomy statute); D. BAILEY, HOMOSEXUALrrY IN
THE WESTERN CHRISTIAN TRADITION 70-81 (1975); W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *215
(a description of sodomy as "a crime not fit to be named" that "the very mention of
which is a disgrace to human nature"). ChiefJustice Burger also discussed the common
law of England and that of the American colonies. Finally, he noted that Georgia passed
its initial sodomy statute in 1816 and has continued to promulgate such statutes "in one
form or another" since then. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2846 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
54 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2846 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
55 Id. at 2847 (Powell, J., concurring). The eighth amendment prohibits cruel and
unusual punishment. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Two different eighth amendment
arguments could possibly legitimize a homosexual's right to consensual sexual activity
and challenge the Georgia statute. The first argument concerns the status of an individ-
ual. In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), the Court held that the eighth
amendment barred a conviction because of the defendant's "status" as a drug addict.
Narcotic addiction was "apparently an illness which may be contracted innocently or
involuntarily." Id. at 667. In Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), the Court refused to
include an alcoholic's public drunkenness in Robinson's protection. The majority distin-
guished the criminalization of public drunkeness from regulating behavior in the privacy
of the home. Id. at 532. In Bowers, Justice Blackmun noted "Homosexual orientation
[Vol. 77900
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Justice Powell noted that the Georgia sodomy statute permits
up to twenty years of imprisonment upon conviction of a sodomitic
act. 56 Justice Powell then measured the punishment for sodomy
against the sentence length for a serious felony such as aggravated
battery, finding the penalties of each crime to be comparable. 57 Jus-
tice Powell suggested that "a prison sentence for such conduct-
certainly a sentence of long duration-would create a serious Eighth
Amendment issue."58 Because the eighth amendment issue had not
been raised below, however, Justice Powell concurred with the
majority.59
Justice Powell noted that Hardwick had not been tried, con-
victed or sentenced for his conduct. 60 He added that the history of
non-enforcement of statutes prohibiting sodomy limited the practi-
cal effect of an eighth amendment argument. 61
D. JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S DISSENT
Justice Blackmun strongly dissented.62 First, Justice Blackmun
disagreed with the majority's "almost obsessive focus on homosex-
ual activity" because he found that the Georgia sodomy statute pro-
hibited sodomy regardless of sex.6 3 Furthermore, he inferred that
the legislative purpose behind Georgia's enactment of § 16-6-2 in
1968 was to broaden the applicability of the sodomy proscription to
homosexuals and heterosexuals.64 Justice Blackmun then con-
may well form part of the very fiber of an individual's personality." Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at
2850 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Homosexuality, therefore, has the potential to be
treated as a "status." Consequently, under the Court's analysis in Robinson, criminal
punishment of the status of homosexuality and its concurrent sexual practices may be
unconstitutional under the eighth amendment.
The second possible eighth amendment argument concerns the correlation be-
tween the length of the sentence and the crime committed. In Weems v. United States,
217 U.S. 349 (1910), the Supreme Court held that the eighth amendment prohibits
sentences that are disproportionate to the severity of the crime. In sodomy cases, the
harmfulness of the crimes is negligible compared to other more heinous crimes receiv-
ing the same or lesser penalties. See notes 55-58 and accompanying text. For a more
expansive view of an eighth amendment analysis of a homosexual's right to engage in
private, consensual relations, see Comment, The Constitutionality of Sodomy Statutes, 45
FORDHAM L. REv. 553, 567-72 (1976).
56 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2847 (Powell, J., concurring).
57 Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
58 Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
59 Id. at 2848 (Powell, J., concurring).
60 Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
61 Id. at n.2 (Powell, J., concurring).
62 Id. at 2848 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun immediately discredited
the majority opinion.
68 Id. at 2849 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
64 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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tended that an intrusion on one's right to privacy and individual as-
sociation is independent of any sexual orientation. 65
Second, Justice Blackmun emphasized that the procedural pos-
ture of the case mandated affirmance "if there is any ground on
which respondent may be entitled to relief."'66 Justice Blackmun re-
marked that the majority should have considered the constitutional-
ity of the statute based on the eighth amendment 67 and the equal
protection clause. 68 Justice Blackmun emphasized, however, that
the statute abridged Hardwick's constitutional rights to privacy and
freedom of intimate association. 69 Justice Blackmun asserted that
the right to privacy alone was sufficient to challenge the constitu-
tionality of § 16-6-2.70
Justice Blackmun then traced the Court's construction of the
right to privacy. He stated that the Court has recognized a right to
privacy "with reference to certain decisions"71 an individual might
make, and "with reference to certain places without regard for the
particular activities in which the individuals who occupy them are
engaged."' 72 Justice Blackmun concluded that Bowers involved both
the decisional and locational aspects of the right to privacy. 73
65 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
66 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun stated that "'a complaint should
not be dismissed merely because a plaintiff's allegations do not support the particular
legal theory he advances', for the court is under a duty to examine the complaint to
determine if the allegations provide for relief on any possible theory." Id. (Blackmun,J.,
dissenting) (quoting Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714, 716 (8th Cir. 1974)). See Parr v.
Great Lakes Co., 484 F.2d 767, 773 (7th Cir. 1973)("a complaint should not be dis-
missed merely because its allegations do not support the legal theory on which the
pleader intends to proceed."); Due v. Tallahassee Theatres, Inc., 333 F.2d 630, 631 (5th
Cir. 1964)("if the complaint alleges facts, which, under any theory of the law, would
entitle the complainant to recover, the action may not be dismissed for failure to state a
claim."); 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL, § 1357,
601-02 (1969).
67 See supra note 55.
68 See infra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.
69 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2850 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
70 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
71 Id. (Blackmun.J., dissenting). See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)(concern-
ing an individual's decision to have an abortion); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925)(concerning the parental decision of guiding their children's education).
72 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2850, 2851 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See United States v.
Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 706 (1984) ("The monitoring of a beeper in a private residence...
violates the Fourth Amendment rights of those who have a justifiable interest in the
privacy of the residence."); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)("The Fourth
Amendment ... prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual en-
try into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest."); Rios v. United
States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960)(evidence seized in an unreasonable search, absent probable
cause was excluded from trial where police seized narcotics from passenger in a taxicab).
73 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2851 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Justice Blackmun then focused on the rationale behind the deci-
sional right to privacy. He stated:
We protect those [privacy] rights not because they contribute, in some
direct and material way, to the general public welfare, but because
they form so central a part of an individual's life. [T]he concept of
privacy embodies the moral fact that a person belongs to himself and
not others nor to society as a whole. 74
Justice Blackmun analyzed why certain rights have been protected
by the fourteenth amendment's due process clause.75 He reasoned
that behind the personal decisions concerning marriage, 76 procrea-
tion, 77 and having a family78 were more basic individual value
choices. Justice Blackmun determined that the effect of each deci-
sion on an individual's self-definition was what had really been pro-
tected.7 9 Justice Blackmun further noted that many individual
values and decisions are expressed through choice of intimate sex-
ual relationships.80
Justice Blackmun then argued that if an individual is free to
choose how to conduct his life, society must accept "the fact that
different individuals will make different choices." 8' Justice Black-
mun concluded that the majority, in refusing to further expand the
right to privacy in Bowers, had in actuality refused to allow individual
choice in intimate associations with others.8 2
Justice Blackmun next contrasted the decisional privacy right
with the locational privacy right, a right attached to the home, where
"the Fourth Amendment attaches special significance."8 3 Justice
Blackmun was unconvinced by the majority's conclusion that Stanley
74 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Thornburgh v. American College of Obstet-
rics & Gynecology, 106 S. Ct. 2169, 2187 n.5 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
75 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
76 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
77 Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetrics & Gynecology, 106 S. Ct. at 2188
n.6 (Stevens, J., concurring).
78 Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500-06 (1977).
79 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2841 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
80 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun asserted, "[T]here may be many
'right' ways of conducting those relationships, and that much of the richness of a rela-
tionship will come from the freedom an individual has to choose the form and nature of
these intensely personal bonds." See Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE
LJ. 624, 637 (1980).
81 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2852 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). As an example,Justice Black-
mun quoted from a case concerning formal schooling for the Amish: "'There can be no
assumption that today's majority is 'right' and the Amish and others like them are
'wrong'. A way of life that is odd or even erratic but interferes with no rights or interests
of others is not to be condemned because it is different.'" Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2852
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 223-24 (1972).
82 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
83 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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v. Georgia84 was entirely a first amendment case. 85 Justice Blackmun
construed Stanley to hold that a state's "power to punish the public
distribution of constitutionally unprotected, obscene material did
not permit the state to punish the private possession of such mate-
rial."8 6 Justice Blackmun declared, moreover, that Stanley concerned
a fourth amendment locational right to individual privacy.8 7 Justice
Blackmun asserted that Stanley's reliance on Olmstead v. United
States,88 a fourth amendment case, advanced Stanley as a fourth
amendment case.89 Justice Blackmun additionally supported his in-
terpretation of Stanley with Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton:90
If obscene material unprotected by the First Amendment in itself car-
ried with it a "penumbra" of constitutionally protected privacy, this
Court would not have found it necessary to decide Stanley on the nar-
row basis of the "privacy of the home" which was hardly more than a
reaffirmation that "a man's home is his castle." 91
From this conclusion in Paris, Justice Blackmun reasserted that
an individual's right to conduct intimate sexual relations within the
privacy of the home was at "the heart of the Constitution's protec-
tion of privacy."'92 Because both the decisional and locational aspects
of privacy were intertwined in Bowers, Justice Blackmun argued that
private, consensual sexual relations provided a most compelling rea-
son to extend constitutional protection to an individual through the
right to privacy. 93
Having shown the magnitude of the liberty interests involved in
Bowers, Justice Blackmun belittled the majority's justification of
Georgia's infringement upon these interests. Justice Blackmun rea-
soned that the two main justifications supporting the Georgia sod-
omy statute-the protection of the state's general health and welfare
and the fact that sodomy had previously been prohibited for a long
period-were insufficient to warrant dismissing Hardwick's chal-
lenge for failure to state a claim. 94
84 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
85 See Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
86 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
87 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
88 227 U.S. 438 (1928).
89 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2852-53 (BlackmunJ., dissenting).
90 413 U.S. 49 (1973)(The right to privacy did not extend to a display of obscene
films in commercial theaters to consenting adult audiences. The state concern of safe-
guarding against crime and other possible effects of obscenity was held to be a legiti-
mate interest.).
91 Id. at 66.
92 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2853 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
93 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
94 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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First, Justice Blackmun declared that the state's interest in pro-
moting "the general public health and welfare" was unsupported. 95
Justice Blackmun noted that the record below did not contain any
evidence supporting the state's claim.96 Furthermore, Justice Black-
mun discredited any analogy between private consensual sexual ac-
tivity and the victimless crimes that Stanley refused to protect.97
Justice Blackmun reasoned that these victimless crimes-"posses-
sion in the home of drugs, firearms, or stolen goods" 98-were not
actually "victimless" because "drugs and weapons are inherently
dangerous, and for property to be 'stolen,' someone must have been
wrongfully deprived of it." 99 Justice Blackmun distinguished
sodomitic activity because "[n]othing in the record before the Court
provides any justification for finding the activity by § 16-6-2 to be
physically dangerous, either to the persons engaged in it or to
others." 100
Second, Justice Blackmun disagreed with the majority that
long-standing religious prohibitions are a sufficient reason to permit
Georgia's interference with an individual's right to privacy.' 01 Jus-
tice Blackmun asserted that the length of time a majority holds its
convictions does not bar an issue from constitutional scrutiny.'0 2
Justice Blackmun further reasoned that the majority's invoca-
tion of traditional Judeo-Christian prohibitions was misguided.
Although certain religious groups condemn sodomitic behavior,
Justice Blackmun pointed out that these proscriptions did not war-
rant a state's imposition of morality on its citizens.' 0 3 Justice Black-
mun stated:
95 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
96 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
97 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
98 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
99 Id. (Blackmun,J., dissenting). For a case concerning the inherent danger of weap-
ons, see McLaughlin v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1677 (1986)(an unloaded hand gun was
termed a dangerous weapon).
100 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2853 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun further
distinguished between private, consensual sexual conduct and adultery and incest, two
sexual crimes on which the majority relied. Id. at 2854 n.4. Adultery "is likely to injure
third persons," and incest is also harmful because "the nature of familial relationships
renders true consent to incestuous activity sufficiently problematical ...." Id. Justice
Blackmun noted that no harm had been shown to the Court regarding private, consen-
sual sexual activity, on the other hand. Id. at 2854.
101 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
102 Id. (Blackmun,J., dissenting). See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)(the right
to an abortion was protected); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)(miscegenation pro-
tected); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)(school segregation held
unconstitutional).
103 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2854 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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A State can no more punish private behavior because of religious in-
tolerance than it can punish such behavior because of racial animus.
"The Constitution cannot control such prejudices, but neither can it
tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but
the law cannot directly or indirectly give them effect.' 10 4
Next, Justice Blackmun rejected Georgia's justification of § 16-
6-2 as a method of promoting public morality. 10 5 Justice Blackmun
distinguished the protection of public sensibilities from the enforce-
ment of private morality upon individuals.' 0 6 Justice Blackmun also
distinguished the regulation of public sexual activity, a legitimate
state concern, from prohibitions of intimate behavior occurring in
private. 10 7 The interests involved in Bowers, Justice Blackmun rea-
soned, were private in nature, and a state could not justify "invading
the houses, hearts, and minds of citizens who choose to live their
lives differently."'10 8
Justice Blackmun concluded his dissent with a plea that the ma-
jority reconsider its analysis, again urging that "depriving individu-
als of the right to choose for themselves how to conduct their
intimate relationships poses a far greater threat to the values most
deeply rooted in our Nation's history than tolerance of non-con-
formity could ever do."' 09
E. JUSTICE STEVENS' DISSENT
Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent.'10 He approached the
case with a two-part analysis. Justice Stevens questioned whether
§ 16-6-2 applied to all persons. He next queried whether specific
enforcement of the statute against homosexuals was constitutional.
Justice Stevens first discussed the constitutionality of the Georgia
104 Id. at 2855 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)(quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429
(1984)). Justice Blackmun also noted that "mere public intolerance or animosity cannot
constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person's physical liberty." Id. See O'Connor
v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975)(State may not confine harmless mentally ill pa-
tient to "save its citizens from exposure to those whose ways are different."); U.S. Dep't.
ofAgric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)("[A] bare congressional desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental inter-
est.")(emphasis in original).
105 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2855 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
106 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
107 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
108 Id. at 2856 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
109 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun referred to W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), in which the Court recognized that an individual's values
outweighed the national threat brought on by a refusal to salute the flag. West Virginia
Board of Education overruled Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
110 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2856 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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sodomy statute as applied to all citizens."'
Justice Stevens noted that the history of the Georgia statute re-
vealed a prohibition of heterosexual as well as homosexual sod-
omy. 112 Therefore, Justice Stevens reasoned, the statute should be
scrutinized based on applicability to all persons regardless of their
sexual orientation.' 13
Justice Stevens next noted two propositions of law to aid in the
analysis. Justice Stevens first asserted that a majority's traditional
view of certain conduct as immoral was insufficient to uphold a law
proscribing such conduct. 14 Second, Justice Stevens noted the pro-
tection already afforded marital intimacy, even absent procreation,
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 15
In addition, Justice Stevens stressed the underlying values sup-
porting the right to privacy. 1 6 He noted that individuals have a
fundamental right to make certain life choices that implicate basic
human values. 117 This individual right often meshes with the "le-
gally sanctioned and protected relationship" of marriage." 8 Justice
Stevens found that the combination of the two protected interests
formed an even more powerful right." 9 Justice Stevens stated,
"when individual married couples are isolated from observation by
others, the way in which they voluntarily choose to conduct their
intimate relations is a matter for them-not the state-to
decide."1 20
After reviewing the Court's decisions in Griswold v. Connecti-
111 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
112 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens undermined the majority's issue
presented in stating, "In reality, however, it is the indiscriminate prohibition of sodomy,
heterosexual as well as homosexual, that has been present 'for a very long time.' " Id. at
n.2.
113 Id. at 2857 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)(miscegena-
tion, once treated as a crime, upheld under the equal protection clause and a due pro-
cess argument).
115 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2857 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See infra notes 156-63 and ac-
companying text.
116 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2858 (StevensJ, dissenting).
117 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens quoted his previous opinion in Fitz-
gerald v. Porter Memorial Hosp., 523 F.2d 716, 719-20 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 916 (1976): "The character of the Court's language... brings to mind ... the
abiding interest in individual liberty that makes certain state intrusions on the citizen's
right to decide how he will live his own life intolerable."
118 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2858 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
120 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that the Georgia Attorney Gen-
eral conceded that § 16-6-2 would be held unconstitutional if applied to a married
couple. Id. at n.10.
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CUt, 12 1 Eisenstadt v. Baird,'2 2 and Carey v. Population Services Interna-
tional,123 Justice Stevens concluded that the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment protects individuals' decisions concern-
ing the intimacies of "nonreproductive, sexual conduct that others
may consider offensive or immoral."' 24 Justice Stevens noted that
the prior case law clearly established that states may not prohibit
private, consensual sodomy between unmarried heterosexual
adults.125 Therefore, Justice Stevens pointed out that § 16-6-2 was,
as a whole, unconstitutional because of proscriptions aimed at a
protected right. 126
Justice Stevens then applied the Georgia statute specifically to
homosexuals. Justice Stevens concluded that since the statute was
inapplicable to heterosexuals, either homosexuals "do not have the
same interest in 'liberty' ",127 as others, or the state must show a
compelling interest to support this criminal statute.' 28 Justice Ste-
vens stated, "the State must assume the burden ofjustifying a selec-
tive application of its law."' 129 Justice Stevens then determined that
every citizen has the same interest in liberty. 130 He further reasoned
that homosexuals and heterosexuals have the same interest in con-
ducting sexual activity.' 3 1 Justice Stevens concluded that the selec-
tive application of the Georgia sodomy statute based upon a
homosexual's differing interests in liberty was clearly
unacceptable. 132
Next, Justice Stevens found no compelling state interest justify-
ing a selective application of § 16-6-2.133 Justice Stevens pointed
out that the majority erred in relying on "'the presumed belief of a
majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is im-
moral and unacceptable.' "134 Justice Stevens elaborated that based
on the statute as written, 13 5 the Georgia electorate reflected the be-
121 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See infra notes 156-63 and accompanying text.
122 405 U.S. 438 (1972). See infra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
123 431 U.S. 678 (1977). See infra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
124 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2858 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
125 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). See infra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
126 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2858 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). See infra notes 251-84 and accompanying text.
129 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
133 Id. at 2859 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
134 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority's opinion, Bowers, 106 U.S. at
2846).
135 See supra note 8.
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lief that all sodomy is immoral, rather than just homosexual
sodomy.'-36
Finally, Justice Stevens discussed the non-enforcement of the
Georgia statute. 137 Justice Stevens showed the banality of Georgia's
representation of the importance of the selective application of
§ 16-6-2. He reasoned that the history of non-enforcement of the
anti-sodomy statute points out that no application of the statute is, in
actuality, "important."'13 8 Justice Stevens therefore concluded that
since Georgia did not justify a selective application of § 16-6-2,
Hardwick had asserted a sufficient constitutional claim to withstand
a motion to dismiss. 139
IV. EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT To PRIVACY
The word privacy itself is notably absent from the Constitu-
tion. 140 The right to privacy, however, has been expressed in many
different forms. Thomas Paine described the natural rights of man
to include "rights ... [of] an individual for his own comfort and
happiness, which are not injurious to the natural rights of
others."141
Mirroring Paine's idea was John Stuart Mill's "harm" principle.
The government may only exercise power over an individual against
his or her will if necessary to prevent harm to others:
[The] sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or col-
lectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their mem-
ber, is self-protection... [T]he only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against
his will, is to prevent harm to others .... The only part of the conduct
of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns
others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence
is, of right, absolute over himself, over his own body and mind, the
individual is sovereign. 142
Warren and Brandeis reiterated Mill's idea of individual auton-
omy absent harm to another in their seminal law review article.' 43
Warren and Brandeis, although writing in the context of tort princi-
ples, recognized a common law protection against the intrusion
136 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2859 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
137 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). See infra notes 296-300 and accompanying text.
138 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
139 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
140 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
141 Comment, The Right of Privacy and Other Constitutional Challenges to Sodomy Statutes, 15
U. TOL. L. REv. 811, 825 (1984) (quoting from F. COKER, READING IN POLrICAL PHILOS-
OPHY 675 (1938)).
142 j. MILL, ON LIBERTY 53 (1859).




The discussion of privacy notions was not limited to philo-
sphers and academics, however. The courts were paramount in the
evolution of the right to privacy. The courts first expressed the
right to privacy in Union Pacific Railway v. Botsford.145 Justice Gray
called "the possession and control of [one's] own person" a sacred
individual right, again protected by the common law against undue
interference by others. 146
Similarly, in Meyer v. Nebraska,147 the Supreme Court held that a
state statute prohibiting the teaching of any foreign language cannot
interfere with individual rights unless a "reasonable relation" to a
state interest was shown. 148 The Court held, in weighing the com-
peting interests, that the legislative desire to cultivate homogeneous
patriotic beliefs did not override the individual's rights. 149
In his famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States,150 Justice Bran-
deis asserted that "the right to be let alone" is "the most compre-
hensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man."' 15 1
The right recognized by Justice Brandeis in Olmstead built upon the
common law right he had previously recognized in his law review
article' 52 that began developing an individual right to autonomy.
In Skinner v. Oklahoma,15 3 the Court, for the first time, used the
due process clause to support the right to privacy.' 54 In Skinner, the
Court invalidated a mandatory criminal sterilization statute, holding
that the state's invasion of personal liberties violated due process. 155
The right to privacy later received explicit constitutional recog-
nition in Griswold v. Connecticut.156 Justice Douglas derived constitu-
tional authority for the right to privacy out of a penumbra of Bill of
Rights protections. 57 Although the exact constitutional directive
was lacking, Justice Douglas reasoned that the right to privacy was
still a part of the Constitution. 158 Justice Douglas found, in the first,
144 See id.
145 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
146 Id. at 251.
147 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
148 Id. at 400.
149 Id. at 402-03.
150 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928)(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
151 Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
152 See supra note 143.
'53 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
154 Id.
155 Id. at 544-45 (Stone, CJ., concurring).
156 381 U.S. 479 (1965).




third, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments, an individual "zone of
privacy."'1 59 Justice Douglas, as an incorporationist, asserted that
the fourteenth amendment made the Bill of Rights applicable to the
states. 160 Rather than finding a separate right to privacy inside the
fourteenth amendment, however, Justice Douglas' right to privacy
sprang from rights already contained in the Bill of Rights. 161 The
Court in Griswold specifically held a criminal statute prohibiting the
use and sale of contraceptives unconstitutional. 62 Griswold can be
broadly interpreted, however, as invalidating any legislation regulat-
ing marital privacy including the right to engage in sodomy.163
The Court next interpreted the right to privacy in Eisenstadt v.
Baird.164 In Eisenstadt, the Court extended Griswold, allowing unmar-
ried individuals the right to use contraceptives. 165 Although Eisen-
stadt was decided on equal protection grounds, 166 the case has often
been cited for the proposition that the right to privacy encompasses
unmarried persons. 167 Hence, Griswold's protection of intimacy in
the marital context has been extended to the individual. Therefore,
Eisenstadt shows that unmarried heterosexuals are protected by the
right to privacy concerning private, consensual sexual fulfillment.
Under Eisenstadt, unwarranted governmental intrusion into an indi-
vidual's private sexual affairs is unconstitutional.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 See id. at 484-85.
162 Id. at 485.
163 Subsequent to the Griswold decision, a majority of courts have ruled that criminal
sanctions cannot be imposed on married couples for deviant sexual conduct. See Cotner
v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968); Lovisi v. Slay-
ton, 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976)(en banc);
Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970), vacated and remanded sub nom.
Wade v. Buchanan, 401 U.S. 989 (1971); Towler v. Peyton, 303 F. Supp. 581 (W.D. Va.
1969)(dictum); Travers v. Paton, 261 F. Supp. 110 (D. Conn. 1966)(dictum); State v.
Bateman, 25 Ariz. App. 1, 540 P.2d 732 (1975), rev'd in part and aff'd in part, 113 Ariz.
107, 547 P.2d 6 (1976)(en banc); State v. Lair, 62 NJ. 388, 301 A.2d 748 (1973)(dic-
turn); Mentek v. State, 71 Wis. 2d 799, 238 N.W.2d 752 (1976)(dictum);Jones v. State,
55 Wis.2d 742, 200 N.W.2d 587 (1972)(dictum). But see Hughes v. State, 14 Md. App.
497, 287 A.2d 299, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1025 (1972)(dictum); State v. Schmidt, 273
Minn. 78, 139 N.W.2d 800 (1966)(dictum); Pruett v. State, 463 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Grim.
App. 1970, appealdismissed, 402 U.S. 902 (197 1)(dictum)). See also Richards, Sexual.uton-
omy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten
Constitution, 30 HASTINGS LJ. 957 (1979); Wilkinson & White, Constitutional Protection for
Personal Lifestyles, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 563 (1977).
164 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
165 Id. at 448-49.
166 See id. at 454-55.
167 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 944 n.12 (1978); Comment, Choice: Personal Autonomy and the Right to Privacy,
14 IDAHO L. REV. 447 (1978).
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The landmark decision of Roe v. Wade 168 solidified the constitu-
tional protection of the right to privacy. The Court, through Justice
Blackmun, held that the right to privacy protected an unmarried wo-
man's right to choose to terminate her pregnancy. 169 The Court in
Roe reasoned that the right to privacy was based on the fourteenth
amendment's concept of liberty. 170 Roe can be seen as protecting
individual choice regarding an intimate decision involving self-
fulfillment.
In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth17 1 the Court once again ex-
panded the right to privacy. The Court held that the right to privacy
extended to minors. In Planned Parenthood, the Court stated that
"[m]inors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and
possess Constitutional rights." 72 The Court further held that a pa-
rental consent requirement for a minor's abortion was unconstitu-
tional. 17 3 This decision reiterated Eisenstadt's teaching that the right
to privacy was inherent in the individual.
Finally, the Court addressed similar issues in Carey v. Population
Services International.174 In Carey, the Court held that a New York
statute prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to minors was
unconstitutional because it prevented minors from making personal
decisions regarding sexual intimacy.' 75 Thus, prior to the decision
in Bowers, the Court had established a definite protection for an indi-
vidual right of privacy.
V. ANALYSIS
The growing controversy concerning the present day fashion-
ing of the right to privacy was not settled by Griswold and its prog-
eny. Prior to Bowers, commentators were far from unanimous
regarding whether to interpet consensual homosexual conduct as
constitutionally protected by the right to privacy.' 76 Lower courts,
too, handed out inconsistent opinions in cases regarding homosex-
ual sexual fulfillment.' 7 7 Bowers, then, was a long-awaited decision
168 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
169 Id. at 153.
170 Id.
171 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
172 Id. at 74.
173 Id. at 72-75.
174 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
175 Id. at 690-91.
176 See supra notes 6, 141; Wilkinson & White, Constitutional Protection for Personal Lifes-
tyles, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 563 (1977). But see Comment, supra note 38.
177 Many lower court decisions held the right to privacy did include individual auton-
omy in sexual expression. See State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976); State v.
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that had the potential to conclusively determine a homosexual's
rights. Unfortunately, while attempting to clear up the controversy,
Bowers only confused matters regarding private, consensual homo-
sexual conduct.
A. THE MAJORITY'S FAULTY DECISION
Justice White framed the issue in Bowers as: "[W]hether the
Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexu-
als to engage in sodomy and hence invalidate the laws of the many
States that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a
very long time."'178 Justice White misconstrued the issue. First, Jus-
tice White blatantly revealed his subjective bias when he remarked
that "the laws of the many States that still make such conduct illegal and
have done so for a very long time."' 179 Such judicial subjectivity is unnec-
essary. By slanting the question presented, Justice White discred-
ited his opinion. A biased question presented logically leads to a
biased, subjective opinion. A Supreme Court opinion should strive
to be objective; personal predilections should have no bearing on
constitutional adjudication.
Second, Justice White framed the issue too narrowly. The
Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy prohibits all people from en-
gaging in so-called "unnatural" acts. 180 Hardwick challenged the
constitutionality of the entire statute. 181 The Court, however, with
minimal explanation, found that the issue only involved homosexual
sodomitic activity.' 82
As a general rule of constitutional adjudication, courts construe
cases and statutes as narrowly as possible. 183 Decisions are based
Saunders, 75 NJ. 200, 381 A.2d 333 (1977); People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476 (1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47
(1980). But see Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976)(en banc); Doe v. Com-
monwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975); Hughes v. State, 14 Md. App.
497, 287 A.2d 299, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1025 (1972); State v. Poe, 40 N.C. App. 385, 252
S.E.2d 843, appeal dismissed, 298 N.C. 303, 259 S.E.2d 304 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
947 (1980); State v. Santos, 413 A.2d 58 (R.I. 1980).
178 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2843.
179 Id. (emphasis added).
180 See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984). The "unnatural" act of sodomy
is the carnal copulation by human beings with each other against nature, or with a
beast, in which sense it includes the crime against nature. Similarly, it includes bes-
tiality, buggery, cunnilingus, and fellatio. In its narrower sense sodomy is the carnal
copulation between two human beings per anus, or by a human being in any man-
ner with a beast.
CJ.S. Sodomy § l(a) (1953)(footnotes omitted).
181 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2842.
182 See id. at 2843.
183 Note, United States v. Lemons: Limiting Constitutional Review in Equal Protection Litiga-
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upon the factual situation of the case at hand, rather than upon hy-
pothetical situations raised by a party.1 84 When a party challenges
the constitutionality of a statute by alleging an infringement of an
individual right, the facts of the challenge apply to how the statute
directly affects the litigant himself.185 Thus, although "facial" at-
tacks186 on the constitutionality of a statute are generally not enter-
tained by courts, there is a notable exception: where a litigant
would impair the constitutional rights of third parties who have no
effective way to preserve those rights themselves.1 87
The exception applies to the Georgia statute at issue in Bowers.
A married heterosexual couple, John and Mary Doe, were initial
party plaintiffs.' 8 8 They were dismissed for lack of standing,189
however, because they had not sustained, nor were they in danger of
sustaining, direct injury from enforcement of the statute. 190 Fur-
thermore, few, if any, people are likely to challenge anti-sodomy leg-
islation because of the probable "notoriety, embarrassment, and
possible economic ruin" associated with such a challenge. 19' A con-
stitutional challenge to an anti-sodomy statute compels an excep-
tion to the general rule. Homosexuals should be able to assert the
rights of third party heterosexuals when challenging the constitu-
tionality of statutes prohibiting sodomy. In Bowers, however, Hard-
wick was not allowed to assert the rights of third parties.
Accordingly, the Bowers majority should have allowed Hardwick to
assert the rights of the married heterosexuals, John and Mary Doe.
If the Georgia sodomy statute had been constitutionally tested
in its entirety, it could have been declared unconstitutional because
of its overbreadth. A statute is overbroad if, while attempting to
control or prevent certain activities, it becomes overinclusive,
tion, 17 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1287, 1291 (1984). See also United States v. National Dairy
Products Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32 (1963)(citing United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22
(1960)).
184 United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960)(the actual fact situation of a case
"frees the Court not only from unnecessary pronouncement on constitutional issues,
but also from premature interpretations of statutes.").
185 See Note, supra note 183, at 1292.
186 Id. A "facial" attack allows a party to challenge the constitutionality of a statute
based on how it might be applied in a hypothetical situation rather than constricting a
court's analysis to a specific factual situation. Id.
187 Id. at 1297. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-14 (1976); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438,446 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965). But
see Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620, 628 (E.D. Va. 1973).
188 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2842 n.2.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Comment, supra note 55, at 565.
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thereby criminalizing previously protected freedoms.1 92 A statute
can be struck down because of overbreadth based on its potential
adverse effect on non-litigants.19 3
The Georgia sodomy statute, as written, applies evenly to heter-
osexuals, whether married or unmarried, and homosexuals. Based
on prior Supreme Court decisions, however, the right to privacy
clearly prohibits a state from interfering with a heterosexual's free-
dom of sexual intimacy. 194
Sodomy is one form of sexual intimacy. Therefore, private,
consensual sodomitic practices performed by married heterosexuals
are constitutionally protected by the right to privacy. Indeed, Geor-
gia conceded that their state sodomy statute, if applied to married
persons, would be an unconstitutional invasion of the right to pri-
vacy under Griswold.195 Similarly, based on Eisenstadt's extension of
Griswold to the unmarried individual, such acts performed by unmar-
ried heterosexuals are also constitutionally protected. If an attack
were made on a state statute prohibiting sodomy by either a married
or unmarried heterosexual the statute would not withstand constitu-
tional scrutiny.
Where a statute is broadly applicable to consensual sodomitic
activities of married couples and unmarried heterosexuals:
[A] possible tactic, regardless of prosecution based on homosexual or
heterosexual activity, is the bringing of an action for a declaratory
judgment as to the constitutionality of the statute and for an injunction
against its enforcement, having a married heterosexual [or unmarried
heterosexuals] be a party, so as to avoid questions of standing to raise
this argument. 196
The Bowers Court should have enabled the respondent to assert the
rights of third party heterosexuals. If a third party heterosexual's
rights had been considered, the Georgia statute would have been
held unconstitutional because of overbreadth.
The Georgia statute could also be constitutionally attacked on
equal protection grounds because it applied only to homosexu-
als.' 97 Although an equal protection argument was not raised be-
192 State v. Willis, 218 N.W.2d 921, 923 (Iowa 1974).
193 Note, Commonwealth v. Bonadio: Voluntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse-A Comparative
Analysis, 43 U. Prrr. L. REV. 253, 273 (1981-82).
194 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965); supra notes 156-75 and accompanying text.
195 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2858 n.10.
196 Annotation, Consent as Defense in Prosecution for Sodomy, 58 A.L.R. 31 636, 641
(1974). See Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970), vacated and re-
manded on other grounds sub nom. Wade v. Buchanan, 401 U.S. 989 (1971).
197 For an extensive look at the applicability of the equal protection clause to homo-
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low, 198 a statute that inherently discriminates against a certain
group of people, such as homosexuals, violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. 199 Without a sufficient compelling inter-
est to justify the unequal application, the Georgia sodomy statute
would be unconstitutional. If a statute prohibited consensual homo-
sexual, but not heterosexual sodomitic activities, the statute would
be inherently discriminatory because it would classify individuals on
the basis of their sexual preference. Therefore, because both case
law200 and a Georgia concession 20 1 point toward the inapplicability
of § 16-6-2 to heterosexuals, the Georgia sodomy statute should
have been held unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.
B. INTERPRETING THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The right to privacy, although often discussed, is a mysterious
and amorphous area of protection. The right to privacy has not
been specifically defined by the judiciary. Rather, the right has
evolved on a case-by-case basis.
The issue of whether the right to privacy protects consensual,
private homosexual sodomy was previously before the Court in Doe
v. Commonwealth's Attorney. 20 2 The United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia held that a Virginia statute criminal-
izing sodomy was constitutional and did not violate an individual's
right to privacy. 20 3 The court reasoned that the state's interest in
promoting morality and decency, coupled with the suppression of
crime, was an action within the reach of Virginia's police power.204
On appeal, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed without an
opinion. 20 5 Absent an opinion to support the affirmance, the prece-
dential value of Commonwealth's Attorney is unclear. The summary af-
firmance only legitimizes the outcome of the case; a summary
affirmance does not necessarily mean the Supreme Court is condon-
ing the lower court's reasoning. 20 6
sexual fulfillment, see Note, Right of Privacy-Consensual Sodomy and the Choice of a Moral
Doctrine: New York's Permissive Position, W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 75, 90-94 (1982-83).
198 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2846 n.8. But see id. at 2849 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("the
procedural posture of the case requires that we affirm the Court of Appeals'judgment if
there is any ground on which respondent may be entitled to relief.").
199 See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
200 See supra note 194.
201 See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
202 425 U.S. 901 (1976), afr'g 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975).
203 Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975).
204 Id. at 1202.
205 425 U.S. 901 (1976), af'g 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975).
206 Comment, supra note 141, at 840.
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Two years later, in Carey v. Population Services International,20 7
while reaffirming a minor's interest in privacy rights, Justice Bren-
nan noted that the Court "has not definitely answered" the question
of a state's power to regulate private, consensual homosexual rela-
tionships. 208 Alternatively, Justice Rehnquist asserted that Common-
wealth's Attorney had settled the question-states can regulate such
behavior.20 9 Lower court decisions and commentators were simi-
larly confused about the meaning of the summary affirmance in Com-
monwealth 's Attorney.210
Bowers answered the questions surrounding the exact view the
Supreme Court would adopt regarding homosexual sodomy. The
majority, in a narrowly written opinion, reviewed the right to privacy
and its applications based on the precise factual patterns of the cases
in which the right had previously been invoked. In this fashion, the
majority interpreted Griswold and its progeny and announced the
right to privacy was strictly based in the context of marriage, the
family, and procreation.2 1'
In support of their narrow interpretation of the right to privacy,
both the majority and Chief Justice Burger, in his concurrence, re-
peated antiquated proscriptions against sodomy.2 1 2 Chief Justice
Burger's entire concurrence, moreover, did little more than list the
"ancient roots" of the proscriptions against sodomy.213 After his
historical journey, ChiefJustice Burger concluded that "to hold that
the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a funda-
mental right would be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching." 214
Chief Justice Burger, in basing his entire concurrence on outdated
laws, rules and teachings, failed to analyze the respondent's claim in
207 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
208 Id. at 694 n.17.
209 Id. at 718 n.2.
210 See State v. Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d 6 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 869
(1977)(unmarried consensual sexual activty); State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa
1976)(unmarried consensual sexual activity); State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 381 A.2d
333 (1977)(fornication); State v. Ciuffini, 164 N.J. Super. 145, 395 A.2d 904 (Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1978)(consensual homosexual activity); People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415
N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981) (consensual ho-
mosexual activity); In re P., 92 Misc.2d 62, 400 N.Y.S.2d 455 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1977)(pros-
titution). But see Berg v. Claytor, 436 F. Supp. 76, 79 (D. D.C. 1977)(holding that
discharge of Navy officer because of homosexuality not violative of constitutional right
of privacy since Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney had established that "an individual's right
to privacy does not extend to homosexual conduct even where it occurs in private be-
tween consenting adults.").
211 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
212 Id. at 2845 n.5.
213 Id. at 2847 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
214 Id. (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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a constitutional light. Although both the majority and the ChiefJus-
tice provided interesting historical perspectives, their lack of legal
reasoning and analysis is apparent.
Justice Blackmun pointed to the deficiencies of both opinions in
his dissent.2 15 He asserted that even though moral judgments are
often "natural and familiar . . . [they] ought not to conclude our
judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them con-
flict with the Constitution of the United States." 2 16 Justice Black-
mun continued:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it
was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it were laid down have vanished long since, and
the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past. 217
Although the majority considered the issue from a constitu-
tional perspective, they failed to address the underlying question in-
volved. The issue involved was not whether a homosexual has a
fundamental right to engage in sodomy. Rather, the actual issue in
Bowers concerned the underlying values linking the privacy cases,
and how these values fit into a particular factual scheme. Justice
Blackmun correctly noted that "this case is no more about 'a funda-
mental right to engage in homosexual sodomy,' as the Court pur-
ports to declare . . . [r]ather, this case is about 'the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men,'
namely, 'the right to be let alone.' "218
Although the right to privacy developed in Griswold evolved
from the context of the marital relationship, subsequent Supreme
Court decisions have expanded that right.219 The right to privacy
has become analogous with the freedom of intimate association.220
The Supreme Court's previous privacy decisions themselves contra-
dict the Bowers majority's notion of a narrow right to privacy.
Eisenstadt freed the right to privacy from the marital context by
expanding the right to use contraceptives to the individual:
It is true that in 6 riswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the
marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent en-
tity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individ-
215 Id. at 2848 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
216 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
217 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L.
REv. 457, 469 (1897)).
218 Id. (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
219 See Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisen-
stadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
220 See generally Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE LJ. 624 (1980).
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uals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the
right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, mar-
ried or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child.221
Eisenstadt, by broadening the right to privacy beyond the marital
bedroom, "served as a foundation for the Court's later widening of
the right to privacy to encompass certain areas of individual decision
making." 222
Furthermore, the marital relationship itself can be viewed sim-
ply as a form of personal association in which individuals have made
a value-expressive life choice. In Loving v. Virginia,223 Chief Justice
Warren, striking down Virginia's miscegenation statutes, reasoned,
"[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital
personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men."'224 ChiefJustice Warren saw that an individual's stake in pur-
suing a fulfilling relationship was what the right to privacy pro-
tected, rather than the marital relationship per se. The right to
privacy, therefore, is not bounded by the marital relationship.
The right to privacy also extends beyond procreative matters.
In its inception, the right to privacy was used to legitimize the use of
contraceptives. 225 The Bowers majority, however, mistakenly classi-
fied the right to privacy as a procreative right.226 The Court's legiti-
mizing the sale and use of contraceptives in Griswold discredits the
Bowers majority's classification of privacy as a procreative right. Roe
further discredits the Bowers majority's notion of privacy as a marital,
procreative right because Roe permitted an unmarried female to
choose to terminate her pregnancy. 227 Thus, Griswold, Eisenstadt,
and Roe have extended the right to privacy to include a general right
of personal autonomy regardless of marital status or procreative
intention.
Additionally, the recognition of a minor's right to privacy in
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth228 directly contradicts the notion of
privacy as a familial right. The right of an unmarried minor to per-
sonal autonomy in no way resembles a familial concern. Further-
more, the fact situations contained in Roe, Eisenstadt, and Carey all
221 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
222 Note, Expanding the Right of Sexual Privacy, 27 Loy. L. REv. 1279, 1286 (1981).
223 338 U.S. 1 (1967).
224 Id. at 12.
225 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
226 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
227 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973).
228 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
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lack familial relationships. In all of these cases, the right to privacy
was contained in the individual rather than the family.
The teaching of Griswold and its progeny, therefore, goes be-
yond the narrow constraints used by the majority in Bowers. Con-
trary to the familial, marital, and procreative interpretations of the
right to privacy, an alternative theory also exists. The right to pri-
vacy can be interpreted as a protection of individual autonomy and
"the freedom to choose lifestyles that serve value-expressive func-
tions" 229 as long as no harm to others occurs. Underlying all of the
Court's previous privacy decisions is the principle that autonomous
choice has constitutional value.
Judge Merhige, dissenting in Commonwealth's Attorney, expressed
the view that the right to privacy is analogous to individual
autonomy:
I view those cases as standing for the principle that every individual
has a right to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
one's decisions on private matters of intimate concern.... To say...
the right of privacy.., is limited to matters of marital, home, or family
life is unwarranted under the law. 230
The freedom to choose, to think, and to act accordingly in an inti-
mate association has been protected by the right to privacy. The
right to privacy broadly encompasses individual autonomy through
sexual expression rather than just the right to purchase contracep-
tives or have an abortion. The broad language involved in the pri-
vacy cases implies a protection of the underlying values that
necessitate the constitutionally protected relationship of marriage,
and the decision of "whether or not to beget or bear a child."'23 1
Therefore, autonomy in individual decision-making regarding pri-
vate consensual sexual relationships is protected by the right to
privacy:
The right to privacy was recognized because it is associated with and
intended to facilitate the exercise of autonomy in certain basic kinds of
choices that bear upon the coherent rationality of a person's life plan.
Therefore, the recognition of autonomy is the basis for and basic to
the right to privacy .... Privacy should, then, be extended to protect
the right of the individual, within or without the social institutions of
marriage or family, to make basic kinds of life choices. 232
In Bowers, Justice Blackmun differentiated between two compo-
229 Wilikinson & White, supra note 163, at 581.
230 Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1203 (E.D. Va. 1975) (Mer-
hige, J., dissenting).
231 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
232 Comment, supra note 141, at 841 (quoting Richards, supra note 168, at 1006-09).
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nents of the right to privacy: the decisional aspect of the right23 3
(analogous to individual autonomy) and the locational aspect. 23 4
Three years after Griswold, the Supreme Court acknowledged in
Stanley v. Georgia23 5 that the locational component of the right to
privacy was crucial. In Stanley, the Court held that the individual has
the right to possess and view, in the privacy of his own home, ob-
scene materials that would be punishable if in the public domain.23 6
While the majority in Bowers attempted to distinguish Stanley as a
first amendment case,23 7 Justice Blackmun correctly noted the inte-
gral fourth amendment concern:
These are the rights that appellant is asserting in the case before us.
He is asserting the right to read or observe what he pleases-the right
to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own
home. The central place that Stanley gives Justice Brandeis' dissent in
Olmstead, a case raising no First Amendment claim, shows that Stanley
rested as much on the Court's understanding of the Fourth Amend-
ment as it did on the first. 23 8
Stanley was crucial to the development of the right to privacy,
expanding its scope beyond the narrow view of privacy as a purely
marital, familial, and procreative right. Stanley firmly established
that privacy protected the sanctity of an individual's residence-"a
man's home is his castle."' 23 9 The Court confirmed Stanley's fourth
amendment focus in Paris Adult Theatre 1,240 where "the Court sug-
gested that reliance on the Fourth Amendment not only supported
the Court's outcome in Stanley but actually was necessary to it
.... "241 The Court reasoned in Paris that "[i]f obscene material
unprotected by the First Amendment in itself carried with it a 'pe-
numbra' of constitutionally protected privacy, this Court would not
have found it necessary to decide Stanley on the narrow basis of the
'privacy of the home .. .. "242 Additionally, Judge Merhige re-
marked in Commonwealth's Attorney, "Stanley teaches that socially con-
demned activity, excepting that of demonstrable external effect, is
... beyond the scope of state regulation when conducted within the
233 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2850.
234 Id. at 2851.
235 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
236 Id. at 568.
237 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2846 ("the decision was firmly grounded in the First
Amendment.").
238 Id. at 2852-53 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564-65.).
239 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 (1973).
240 Id.
241 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2853.
242 Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 66.
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privacy of the home." 243
Thus, Stanley proposed that the right to privacy includes inti-
mate relationships occurring in private. When Stanley's locational
privacy component is linked with the component of individual au-
tonomy, a vast privacy right is formed.244 The right to the private,
consensual sexual behavior involved in Bowers hinges on both as-
pects of the right to privacy and, therefore, a substantial privacy
right encompassing sexual lifestyle choices should be recognized in
this context.
The Bowers majority, along with ChiefJustice Burger, in his con-
currence, attempted to limit the right to privacy to certain "funda-
mental liberties." 245 The Bowers Court proposed a test to determine
whether a right was fundamental: unless a right was "implied in the
concept of ordered liberty" or "deeply rooted in this Nation's his-
tory and tradition," the Court would not deem the right fundamen-
tal. 246 The Court concluded that the right to engage in homosexual
sodomy was not fundamental because of ancient proscriptions
against sodomy.247
The right to privacy, when viewed as the right to individual au-
tonomy, still complies with the majority's framework of "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty" or "deeply rooted in this Nation's
history." The right to privacy, therefore, even if measured by the
majority's narrow standards, is a fundamental right. Privacy in inti-
mate personal decisions has long been considered paramount to the
well-being of individuals.248 Although sodomy itself may not be
rooted in tradition, individual autonomy is. Despite the majority's
topical and narrow question presented, the application of their test
rings true; the right of individual autonomy is both "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty" and "deeply rooted in this Nation's his-
tory and tradition," and should be declared a fundamental right.
C. APPLICATION OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY TO HOMOSEXUAL
SODOMY
A homosexual derives sexual gratification and intimacy in ways
that are proscribed by anti-sodomy statutes. 249 It follows that pri-
243 Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1205 ( E.D. Va. 1975)(Mer-
hige, J., dissenting).
244 Wilkinson & White, supra note 163, at 590.
245 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2844, 2847.
246 Id. at 2844. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
247 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2846.
248 See supra notes 140-55 and accompanying text.
249 See generally G. WEINBERG, SOCIETY AND THE HEALTHY HOMOSEXUAL (1970).
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vate, consensual relationships between homosexuals should be con-
stitutionally protected because sexual intimacy is a personal life
choice included in the right to privacy. Furthermore, the locational
privacy concerns protected by Stanley enhance a homosexual's con-
stitutional guarantee of privacy. If a person can watch obscene films
for self-gratification within the home, then, logically, a person
should be permitted to engage in other forms of consensual sexual
gratification within a private residence.
Both the decisional and locational aspects of the right to privacy
support a constitutional guarantee of freedom regarding a homo-
sexual's sexual intimacy. If individual autonomy rights constitute
the basis of a constitutional right to privacy, then these same rights
would compel acceptance of an individual's right to choose a sex
partner. In Bowers, the homosexual activity involved was carried on
in private, and involved an intimate life choice.250 The constitu-
tional guarantee of a right to privacy in Bowers is extremely
compelling.
D. THE BALANCING TEST
The Supreme Court in Roe held that a state may assert a com-
pelling interest and prohibit a person from exercising a personal,
value-expressive decision regardless of the possibility of infringing
on a fundamental right.25' If a homosexual's right to engage in pri-
vate, consensual sodomy is fundamental, 252 the Georgia sodomy
statute must be found unconstitutional unless the state of Georgia
can show a compelling interest to regulate such activity.
A state may attempt to assert a variety of interests in order to
outweigh a homosexual's fundamental right to personal autonomy.
One possible state interest is the preservation of heterosexual mar-
riage as an institution.253 The regularity of non-enforcement of ex-
isting fornication and adultery statutes, however, shows the
hypocrisy of this argument. 254 In his dissent in Doe, Judge Merhige
accurately stated that "to suggest ... that the prohibition of homo-
sexual conduct will in some manner encourage new heterosexual
marriages and prevent the dissolution of existing one's is unworthy
250 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2842.
251 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
252 The assumption that a homosexual does have a fundamental right to engage in
private, consensual sodomy will be carried on throughout the analysis in order to deter-
mine the validity of possible state interests.
253 See Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1205 (E.D. Va.
1975)(Merhige, J,, dissenting); People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 490, 415 N.E.2d 936,
941, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 952 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
254 See Comment, supra note 141, at 857.
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of judicial response. 255
A state may also attempt to assert a compelling state interest in
protecting children against sexual offenses by homosexuals. 256
However, "there is no evidence to support the belief that homosex-
uals generally tend to be more violent than heterosexuals, and some
evidence to suggest that they are less violent." 257
Addtionally, a state may desire to protect public morals. States
can and do legislate morality. 258 A vast difference clearly exists,
however, between legislating public morality and legislating private
morality. Stanley showed that although the state could proscribe ob-
scene material in the public domain, the same obscene material was
permissible if viewed in the privacy of the home and no harm came
to others. 259 Thus, while states may regulate morality in the public
domain, they should not attempt to mold individual thought by leg-
islating private morality. A lower court expressed a similar idea:
"the regulation of private morality.., is not an appropriate exercise
of the police power." 260 Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Bonadio,26' a
lower court ruled that states could not use their police power to en-
force a majority morality on persons whose conduct did not harm
others.
Moreover, the public's concept of morality changes with time.
Many personal life choices once considered unnatural are now be-
coming acceptable. 262 State legislatures should recognize the pub-
lic's changing morality and update antiquated statutory
prohibitions. For example, the present day availability of contracep-
tives makes it difficult to imagine that only twenty-one years have
passed since Griswold: "such is the pace of constitutional litigation
in this area that Griswold v. Connecticut already seems something of a
grandfather case." 263 Ultimately, decriminalization of anti-sodomy
statutes will depend more upon the acceptance of changing morals
than upon the recognition of a freedom for individual autonomy.
264
In Bowers, Georgia asserted the legislation of private morality as
255 Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. at 1205 (Merhige, J., dissenting).
256 Comment, supra note 141, at 857.
257 Comment, supra note 141, at 857.
258 See generally P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT Or MORALS (1965).
259 See supra notes 235-43 and accompanying text.
260 State v. Saunders, 75 NJ. 200, 220, 381 A.2d 333, 342 (1977).
261 490 Pa. 91, 95-96, 415 A.2d 47, 50 (1980).
262 Richards, Unnatural Acts and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Moral Theory, 45
FORDHAM L. REV. 1281, 1289-90 n.44 (1977).
263 Wilkinson & White, supra note 163 at 564.
264 Note, The Right to Privacy: A Renewed Challenge to Laws Regulating Private, Consensual
Behavior, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 1067, 1083-84 (1979).
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a possible compelling interest. 265 If a state asserts private morality
as a compelling interest, the state is, in effect, deciding whether or
not an individual right is indeed fundamental. 266 By determining
that a majority of legislators' moral views should be thrust upon an
individual regardless of personal tastes, preferences and lifestyle
choices, the Georgia legislature has declared that the state's choice
of morality is paramount to the individual's, regardless of the exist-
ence of a compelling interest. However, an individual's right to
make value-expressive life choices in private falls within the zone of
the constitutionally protected right to privacy 2 67 and should not be
overturned by a state's injection of private morality.
A state's most compelling interest in the area of sexual auton-
omy is the promotion of public health.268 The outbreak of the Ac-
quired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) virus269 has advanced
this state interest. Georgia's interest in the prevention of AIDS,
however, should not outweigh Hardwick's interest in the freedom of
autonomous choice. Sodomy statutes proscribe certain kinds of sex-
ual behavior and expression. Undoubtedly, AIDS can be transmit-
ted through an act of sodomy; yet, theform of the sexual act does
not transmit AIDS. 270 Both "natural" and "unnatural" sexual activ-
ity can transmit the disease. In fact, AIDS is rapidly becoming more
prevalent in the heterosexual community.2 71
Certainly, homosexuals are classified as a high risk group to
contract AIDS.2 72 Evidence indicates, however, that discriminating
against homosexuals by criminalizing their form of sexual expres-
sion may actually exacerbate the spread of AIDS rather than de-
265 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2846.
266 Note, The Constitionality of Laws Forbidding Private Homosexual Conduct, 72 MICH. L.
REV. 1613, 1636 (1974).
267 See notes 219-32 and accompanying text.
268 Comment, supra note 38, at 623.
269 See generally Wallis, AIDS: A Growing Threat, TIME, Aug. 12, 1985, at 41. The AIDS
virus neutralizes the body's immune system and allows bacteria or a virus to cause dis-
ease. Curan, Morgan, Hardy, Jaffe, Darrow & Dowdle, The Epidemiology of AIDS: Current
Status and Future Prospects, 229 Sci. MAG. 1352, 1354 (Sept. 1985). Typical symptoms of
AIDS are fever, weight loss, diarrhea, sore throat, swollen lymph nodes, and other gen-
eral discomfort. Id. Persons can have AIDS without suffering from the symptoms. Wal-
lis, supra, at 42. These individuals are termed "carriers". Id. Symptomatic AIDS
victims and "carriers" can transmit the disease in many ways: sexual conduct through
the exchange of body fluids; through intravenous drug abuse; through blood transfu-
sions, and by mother to child at birth. Curan, Morgan, Hardy, Jaffe, Darrow & Dowdle,
supra, at 1354.
270 Comment, supra note 141, at 855-56.
271 Wallis, AIDS: A Growing Threat, TIME, Aug. 12, 1985, at 43.
272 Id. at 41.
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crease it.273 In order to prevent a further spread of AIDS, those
victims already infected must be able to come forward freely to ob-
tain medical diagnosis and treatment. The Georgia sodomy statute
deters such voluntary participation and openness. The fear of being
criminally prosecuted can only deter people from seeking diagnosis
and treatment, and a lack of medical care will lead to furthering the
spread of the disease.
Furthermore, the threat of contracting AIDS may well itself be
more of a deterrence to homosexual conduct than a criminal sanc-
tion against it.274 In addition, the social stigma of homosexuality,
supported by legislative discrimination, detracts from the
probability of stable homosexual relationships. 275 Therefore, pro-
miscuous relationships may develop to fulfill a homosexual's sexual
needs. Promiscuous relationships increase the chances of con-
tracting and transmitting AIDS because of the increased amount of
intimate contact with different people.276 Perhaps an understanding
and acceptance of homosexuality and its concurrent sexual activity
will help limit the spread of AIDS.
The record in Bowers, however, did not contain any data in sup-
port of the state's claim of the prevention of AIDS as a compelling
interest. 277 Justice Blackmun reasoned:
In light of the state of the record, I see no justification for the Court's
attempt to equate the private, consensual sexual activity at issue here
with the "possession in the home of drugs, firearms, or stolen goods"
to which Stanley refused to extend the protection. None of the behav-
ior so mentioned in Stanley can properly be viewed as "[v]ictimless"
278
Whereas the drugs and weapons asserted by the majority as vic-
timless are in actuality inherently dangerous, 279 nothing in the rec-
ord justifies any physical danger involved in sodomitic acts, whether
to the participants or others. 280 Because no harm has been shown,
Mill's principle 28' seems to govern: an individual should be free to
pursue private, consensual intimate relations without governmental
interference.
273 Comment, supra note 141, at 856. See also Richards, supra note 163, at 986 n.127;
Note, supra note 266, at 1632-33.
274 Comment, AIDS-A New Reason to Regulate Homosexuality? 11 J. CONTEMP. L. 315,
338 (1984).
275 Comment, supra note 38, at 625.
276 Comment, supra note 38, at 625.
277 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2853 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
278 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
279 See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
280 See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
281 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, the "connection between the acts prohibited by
§ 16-6-2 and the harms identified ... is a subject of hot dispute
. "...-282 A threat as new and unexplored as AIDS is insufficient to
support a compelling state interest to override an individual's right
to privacy.
E. A SHIFT IN SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
The Supreme Court's modem right to privacy decisions have
their beginnings in the discredited doctrine of substantive due pro-
cess. 28 3 The doctrine of substantive due process implies that the
Court uses its own notion ofjustice and places this view of morality
into social policy. 284 Substantive due process was invoked to hold
laws unconstitutional because the Court believed that the legislature
had acted unwisely.285 The doctrine can be widely seen as an injec-
tion of judicial morality as a basis of the Court's decision making.
The Court first used this doctrine in the economic area.286
Despite eventually repudiating substantive due process in the
economic sphere,28 7 the Court relied on the theory in the area of
personal liberties.288 Griswold has been criticized as a return to the
days of substantive due process: "while eschewing the substantive
due process mode of analysis, he [Justice Douglas] embraced its
very language." 28 9
Additionally, the Roe opinion was said to be a twin of the Lochner
decision because both decisions had strands of substantive due pro-
cess running through them.290 Perhaps all of the Warren Court pri-
282 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2853 n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
283 Ely, The Wages of Crying Wof. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE LJ. 920, 940
(1973) ("criticism of the Lochner philosophy [substantive due process] has been virtually
universal").
284 See generally GUNTHER, CONSTrUTIONAL LAw 441-585 (1985).
285 Id.
286 Id. See Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923)(District of Columbia
law prescribing minimum wages for women violated due process); Coppage v. Kansas,
236 U.S. 1 (1915)("yellow dog" contract condition that employees not belong to a
union held violative of due process); Lochnerv. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) ("There is
no reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty of a person or the right of free
contract .... ").
287 See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934)("[a] state is free to adopt
whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare"); West
Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)(state minimum wage law held
constitutional).
288 Ely, The Wages of Crying Wof. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE LJ. 920, 940-41
(1973).
289 Comment, Notes From the Underground: A Substantive Analysis of Summary Adjudication
by the Burger Court: Part II, 19 Hous. L. REV. 831, 849 (1982).
290 Ely, supra note 288, at 940.
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vacy decisions can be grouped together and viewed as a
"superimposition of the Court's own value choices." 29 1 Justice
Douglas and his brethren injected their own views of liberty to over-
ride inappropriate state statutes. The Warren Court as a whole,
however, "attempted to defend its decisions in terms of inferences
from values the Constitution marks as special." 292 Critics of the au-
tonomy notion of privacy belittle the Warren Court's interpretation
because of its reliance on substantive due process. Yet, query if the
opposition to the autonomy interpretation of privacy stands on firm
constitutional grounds or on their own personal morality.
In Bowers, the majority and Chief Justice Burger, in concur-
rence, merely manifested their personal disdain towards homosex-
ual conduct. The Bowers majority ignored and misread its own
precedents. By doing so, the Court was simply favoring its own mo-
rality over the Warren Court's morality. The Bowers majority en-
gaged in the exact substantive due process analysis that it purported
to shy away from.
The Warren Court used a substantive due process philosophy
to expand individual liberties in the area of intimate association.29 3
The right to privacy was continually broadened by the Warren
Court based on their view of the values that emanated from the
Constitution. 29 4 The Bowers Court, however, reversed the trend and
attempted to drastically limit the right to privacy. While purporting
to limit "the imposition of the Justices' own choice of values on the
States and the Federal Government, ' 29 5 the Bowers majority en-
gaged in its own form of substantive due process reasoning. In fact,
the Bowers majority's reasoning provides less constitutional support
than Griswold or Roe. Interestingly, the Bowers majority asserted sub-
stantive due process in a new light by limiting the right to privacy
and individual autonomy in the area of sexual expression. The Bow-
ers majority has simply injected their own morality in an attempt to
shut the door on the right to privacy.
F. REPERCUSSIONS OF BOWERS
The Bowers decision will probably have little, if any, effect on
homosexual conduct. A judicial stamp of approval on a legislative
act will not suddenly stop individuals from making value-expressive
life choices. Sodomy statutes are rarely enforced against consenting
291 Ely, supra note 288, at 940.
292 Ely, supra note 288, at 943.
293 See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
294 See supra notes 156-63 and accompanying text.
295 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
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adults engaged in private sexual activity. 296 Three factors support a
general non-enforcement of state sodomy statutes. First, police pol-
icy generally views sodomitic acts as relatively harmless and not de-
serving of manpower which could better be utilized to combat more
serious crimes. 297 Second, the gathering of constitutionally valid
evidence in sodomy cases is practically impossible.298 Third, and
most importantly, the infrequent enforcement of sodomy statutes
implies that they do not actually reflect public morality.299 The Bow-
ers decision will therefore have little bearing on homosexual conduct
in the future. By condoning the criminalization of homosexual sod-
omy, the Court has approved a rule that is impossible to enforce.
The real value of Bowers, therefore, is purely symbolic. This sym-
bolic opinion, however, may give both "police and political leader-
ship a dangerous tool for persecution of selected enemies. ' 00
Bowers must be overruled, and soon.
The resignation of ChiefJustice Burger and the appointment of
Justice Scalia do not appear to shift the Supreme Court's view con-
cerning homosexual sodomy and the right to privacy. A homosex-
ual's right to engage in private, consensual sexual acts may,
however, gain Supreme Court recognition if an anti-sodomy statute
is challenged on alternative grounds. For example, an equal protec-
tion challenge appears particularly compelling. Moreover, Justice
Powell's suggestion of eighth amendment protection 0 ' may pro-
vide a different avenue to advance a homosexual's right of individ-
ual autonomy concerning sexual activity.
The Bowers Court incorrectly interpreted the right to privacy
and reversed the current trend of expanding individual rights in the
area of sexual expression. It seems unlikely that the Court will shift
from its present view that the right to privacy does not encompass
homosexual conduct. Each individual state still burdened by anti-
sodomy legislation should take the initiative to declare its own stat-
utes unconstitutional. Unfortunately, the state legislatures have
been slow to abrogate their proscriptions against sodomy. Perhaps
the greatest opportunity to enhance a homosexual's right to sexual
intimacy lies in an equal protection or eighth amendment challenge
to the existing anti-sodomy statutes. Regardless of the process, it is
296 Comment, supra note 55, at 564-65.
297 Comment, supra note 55, at 564-65.
298 Comment, supra note 55, at 565.
299 Note, supra note 266, at 1618.
300 Clark, Courting Disaster, PLAYBOY, Dec. 1986, at 244.
301 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2847-48.
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time to grant homosexuals the right to engage in consensual, pri-
vate relations in order to achieve their values of sexual fulfillment.
GARY S. CAPLAN
